The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies Higashijima Masaaki
Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypic images of autocratic politics, modern autocrats often introduce relatively free and fair elections wherein they refrain from employing…
Specifikacia The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies Higashijima Masaaki
Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypic images of autocratic politics, modern autocrats often introduce relatively free and fair elections wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral manipulation and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such "electoral reforms" happen in modern autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? With these questions in mind, this book explores the manners in which dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. This book argues that strong autocrats, who can effectively obtain popular support through extensive economic distribution, become less dependent on coercive measures in elections. The theory and empirical findings presented in this book suggest that signs of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough for these regimes to achieve