Leveraging Latency: How the Weak Compel the Strong with Nuclear Technology Volpe Tristan A.
Leveraging Latency: How the Weak Compel the Strong with Nuclear Technology Volpe Tristan A. Over the last seven decades, some states successfully leveraged the threat of acquiring atomic weapons to…
Specifikacia Leveraging Latency: How the Weak Compel the Strong with Nuclear Technology Volpe Tristan A.
<strong>Leveragingstrong> <strong>Latencystrong>: How the <strong>Weakstrong> <strong>Compelstrong> the Strong with Nuclear Technology Volpe Tristan A.
Over the last seven decades, some states successfully leveraged the threat of acquiring atomic weapons to <strong>compelstrong> concessions from superpowers. When does nuclear <strong>latencystrong>--the technical capacity to build the bomb--enable states to pursue effective coercion?In <strong>Leveragingstrong> <strong>Latencystrong>, Tristan A. For many others, however, this coercive gambit failed to work.
Volpe finds that there is a trade-off between threatening proliferation and promising nuclear restraint. Volpe argues that having greater capacity to build weaponry doesn't translate to greater coercive advantage. States need just enough bomb-making capacity to threaten proliferation, but not so much that it becomes too difficult for them to offer nonproliferation assurances.
The boundaries of this sweet spot align with the capacity to produce the fissile material at the heart of an atomic weapon.To test this argument,
How the Weak Win Wars